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Until Debt Do Us Part: The Need for Revision of
Article 2364 Reimbursement Claims for Student Loan
Debts
INTRODUCTION
The day that you have been waiting for your entire life is finally
here. Today, you will marry your sweetheart, the love of your life,
and the answer to your every prayer. Today, your $100,000 student
loan debt is the furthest thing from your mind. However, it may be
the first thing on your mind if you and your spouse later file for
divorce.
Your divorce is bad enough in its own right. You must decide
who gets the house, the car, and custody of the children. However,
you may sustain the biggest blow when you least expect it—when
your spouse files a reimbursement claim to recover $50,000 of the
money that he or she “contributed” to your student loan debts.1 Even
though those loans ultimately secured the high-paying job that
provided the basis for you and your spouse’s elevated standard of
living, Louisiana’s community property regime makes such a claim
for reimbursement possible.2
The offending legislation lies in Louisiana Civil Code article
2364, which provides a remedy for the non-debtor spouse in the
event that he or she contributed to a separate debt during the
marriage:
If community property has been used during the existence of
the community property regime or former community
property has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate
obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to
reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the
property had at the time it was used.
Considering current trends in student loan debt and marriage, it
is entirely inequitable to allow one spouse to file a reimbursement
claim against the other spouse to recover half of the value of the
debt.3 This is primarily because the spouse claiming the
reimbursement benefited from the increased standard of living
during the marriage. Student loan debt is a part of most modern
marriages and thus a prospective issue at divorce.4 Due to the lack of

1.
2.
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4.
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jurisprudence and specific legislation available to solve this issue,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 must be amended to limit
reimbursement claims for student loan debt, or alternatively, a
jurisprudential rule must be adopted in order to ensure equity5 and
reflect societal expectations.6
Part I of this Comment discusses current statistics surrounding
education, marriage, and student loan debt in the United States. It
also gives an overview of the fundamental aspects of community
property law in Louisiana. Part II presents Louisiana’s current
approach to handling reimbursement claims, as well as claims
specifically dealing with student loan debt.7 Part III explains why
student loan debt should be the exception to the general rule
allowing reimbursement claims. It explores the characteristics of
such debt that make it different and views reimbursement claims for
student loan debt through the lenses of equity and societal
expectation. Finally, Part IV proposes that Louisiana must either
establish a jurisprudential rule or enact legislation that limits
reimbursement claims for student loan debt. Adopting these
proposed solutions would ensure that Louisiana’s community
property laws reflect the current needs of society.
I. LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT
The most convincing evidence of the need for change in
Louisiana’s treatment of student loan debt lies in statistics. People
are getting married later in life,8 are better educated when they do
marry,9 and many enter marriage with student loan debt.10 These
characteristics of many modern marriages clash with Louisiana’s
community property law, demonstrating a vital need for change.

5. See discussion infra Part III.B.
6. See discussion infra Part III.C.
7. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2358 (2014) (providing the basis for allowing
reimbursement claims).
8. Sharon Jayson, Sooner vs. Later: Is There an Ideal Age for First
Marriage?, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-11-09delayed-marriage_N.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2008) [http://perma.cc/8GDH55NL] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (noting that the age of first marriage has been
climbing steadily for all racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups).
9. Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/07/the-end-of-men/308135 [http:
//perma.cc/6VYD-JXYR] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
10. See Meta Brown, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Maricar Mabutas &
Wilbert van der Klaauw, Grading Student Loans, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Mar. 5,
2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/03/grading-student-loans
.html [http://perma.cc/WWH8-5UMJ] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
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A. Societal Trends in Education and Marriage
Fifty years ago, the average American family often lived behind
a metaphorical “white picket fence—one man, one woman, and [a]
bunch of happy kids.”11 American marriage demographics,
however, have significantly changed.12 In order to account for these
changing statistics and their effect on society’s expectations of
marriage, Louisiana must revise its community property laws.
The last time that Louisiana revised its law governing
community property was in 1980.13 At that time, women were
viewed as “second-class citizens,” while men dominated positions
of power and influence.14 Unfortunately, Louisiana’s current
matrimonial regimes law still embraces these antiquated opinions.15
In the approximately 35 years that have passed since the last
revision, the role of women in society has changed immensely,
bringing them out of the home and into the workplace.16 Not only
have women managed to establish much more equality between the
sexes, but also, in many respects, they have risen beyond the
capacities of their male counterparts.17 Women dominate the
11. Rosin, supra note 9.
12. James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 4, 5.
Today, relatively fewer of us are living in family households, and
particularly in ‘traditional’ nuclear families, than did so earlier in the 20th
century. The trend toward living in nonfamily households (usually alone)
is associated with . . . delayed marriage among young adults . . . .
[E]conomic roles within the family have shifted significantly . . . . In
particular, regardless of the presence of children, including infants, wives
now are more likely to work outside the home than to work solely as
homemakers.
Id.
13. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES § 7:13, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 562 (3d ed. 2007).
14. Rosin, supra note 9. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (repealed eff. Jan.
1, 1980) (“The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of
gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and
may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission of his
wife.”).
15. In enacting article 121, the Legislature sought to protect women who
supported their husbands throughout their education, only to be met with divorce
after their graduations. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See generally Rosin, supra note 9.
17. See id. In fact, as of 2010, women hold a majority of the nation’s jobs,
and they bring home approximately 42.2% of the household income (up from a
mere 2–6% in 1970), and four in ten mothers are the primary source of income for
their families. Id.
Women now hold 51.4% of managerial and professional jobs—up from
26.1% in 1980. They make up 54% of all accountants and hold about
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campuses of colleges and professional schools, obtaining three
bachelor’s degrees for every two attained by men.18 In fact, men are
now more likely than women to hold only a high-school diploma.19
These changing demographics are particularly significant
because, though fewer people are getting married,20 those who do
marry are older and better educated than in the past.21 The time
required to obtain higher education leads to a higher age of first
marriage because more people are waiting to finish their college and
professional education before getting married.22 The current median
age for first marriage is the oldest that it has been since the Census
Bureau began keeping records in the 1890s: almost 26 for women
and 27 for men.23 The connection between these educational and
marital statistics demonstrates that couples entering into marriage
are in a very different position than they were in the past. Observed
together, these changing demographics exhibit one simple thing:
Many more couples are going into marriage after obtaining higher

Id.

half of all banking and insurance jobs. About a third of America’s
physicians are now women, as are 45% of associates in law firms—and
both those percentages are rising fast.

18. Id. The numbers are truly staggering—women earn 60% of all bachelor’s
and master’s degrees, approximately 50% of all law and medical degrees, and
42% of all M.B.A.s. Id. Rosin additionally notes that of the 15 job categories
projected to grow most in the next decade in the United States, women primarily
occupy 13 of them. Id.
19. Id.
20. Stephanie Hallet, Marriage Rate in America Drops Drastically,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011, 2:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/12/14/marriage-rates-in-america_n_1147290.html [http://perma.cc/3MN72RLT] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
21. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES 11 (2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11
/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/XUS9-ESNN] (archived
Mar. 8, 2014). In 1960, college graduates (76%) were only slightly more likely
than those who never attended college (72%) to marry. Id. By 2008, that gap
widened significantly. Only 48% of those with a high school diploma or less were
married, compared with 64% of college graduates. Id.
22. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and
Their Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27 (2007). See also Jayson,
supra note 8.
23. Jayson, supra note 8. For comparison, in 1980, the time of the last
revision of community property laws, the median age of first marriage was 24.7
for men and 22.0 for women. Median Age at First Marriage, PEARSON EDUC.,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
[http://perma.cc/D6LV-EJ2E] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
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educational degrees and, as a result, are marrying with increasing
amounts of student loan debt.24
This interconnection between marriage and student loan debt is
particularly important because today’s society places a higher value
on education than ever before.25 The cost of college tuition has
increased by approximately 900% since 1978.26 As a result, many
students are finding it necessary to pay for their higher education by
taking out student loans. In fact, there are approximately 37 million
student loan borrowers with debts totaling between $902 billion and
$1 trillion.27 In 2011, 46% of Louisiana college seniors had student
loan debt, which averaged $22,455.28 Student loan debt is now
24. See Brown et al., supra note 10.
25. Society’s current expectations regarding the education level required for
even lower paying jobs means that being without a bachelor’s degree is essentially
not an option. In many circumstances, even a bachelor’s degree is not considered
to be a substantial accomplishment, and it certainly does not guarantee
employment. See Greg Ip, The Declining Value of Your College Degree, WALL
ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121623686919059307.html (last updated
July 17, 2008) [http://perma.cc/JP3K-55FA] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that
a degree “isn’t any big guarantee of employment, it’s a basic requirement, a step
you have to take to even be considered for many professional jobs”). Additionally,
as of 2011, nearly 28% of Americans have a bachelor’s degree, compared to less
than 5% in 1940. See Alex Richards, Census Date Shows Rise in College Degrees,
but also in Racial Gaps in Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 23, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Census-Data-Reveal-Rise-in/126026/ [http://perma.cc
/ZW5L-EXQ2] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
workers 18 and over possessing bachelor’s degrees earn an average of $67,140 per
year, while those with a high school diploma earn a mere $35,170. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS 2012–
2022 tbl. 7 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf
[http://perma.cc/595U-8LK5] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). Workers with a
professional degree top the chart making an average of $96,420 per year. Id.
26. Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans an Impending Bubble? Is Higher
Education a Scam?, BENZINGA (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.benzinga
.com/11/04/1032314/are-student-loans-an-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-ascam [http://perma.cc/UU4S-FSNM] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that since
1978, the price of tuition at U.S. colleges has increased over 900%, 650 points above
inflation). Doyle put this number in perspective, noting that housing prices, the
bubble that nearly burst the U.S. economy, increased only 50 points during those
years. Id.
27. See Rohit Chopra, Too Big to Fail: Student Debt Hits a Trillion,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/too
-big-to-fail-student-debt-hits-a-trillion (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) [http://perma
.cc/3ZY-YY8Q] (archived Mar. 8, 2014); see also Brown et al., supra note 10.
28. See Matthew Reed & Debbie Cochrane, The Project on Student Loan
Debt, INST. FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS, http://projectonstudentdebt.org/state_by
_state-data.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) [http://perma.cc/WN5D-SS7R]
(archived Mar. 8, 2014). Additionally, on a national basis, 40% of U.S. households
headed by someone 35 years old or younger have student loan debt. See Hope
Yen, Student Loan Debt Stretches to New Record Number of Households: Pew
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commonplace, and many individuals enter into marriage knowing
that they or their future spouse will likely have student loan debt.29
Couples marrying today differ greatly from the married couple
envisaged by the revision of Louisiana’s matrimonial regimes law in
1980. Compared to past couples, many of today’s couples are more
socially and economically equal, enter marriage at an older age, are
better educated, and are much more likely to enter into the marriage
carrying substantial student loan debt. Unfortunately, however,
Louisiana’s community property regime has yet to account for these
changes.
B. The Basic Tenants of Community Property Law in Louisiana
The default legal regime governing marriage in Louisiana is a
community of acquets and gains—commonly referred to as a
“community property regime.”30 Under this regime, the property of
a married couple is classified as either separate or community.31
Generally, community property consists of property obtained during
the marriage through the “effort, skill, or industry of either spouse”
and also property obtained with community things or with a
combination of community and separate things.32 Each spouse owns
Research Analysis, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:06 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/student-loan-debt-households-record_n_1917681
.html [http://perma.cc/F8AB-8RQV] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). On an individual
basis, college seniors graduating in 2012 accumulated an average debt of $25,250.
Id.
29. See Jennifer Ludden, Call Me Maybe When Your Student Loan Is Paid in
Full, NPR (July 16, 2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/16/156736915
/call-me-maybe-when-your-school-loan-is-paid-in-full [http://perma.cc/PQE8-5N
4J] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334 (2014) (“The legal regime of community of
acquets and gains applies to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their
domicile at the time of marriage or the place of celebration of the marriage.”).
31. See id. art. 2335 (“Property of married persons is either community or
separate.”).
32. See id. art. 2338 (stating that additional classifications of community
property include property donated to the spouses jointly, natural and civil fruits of
community property, damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to
the community, and all other property not classified by law as separate property);
see generally Cameron v. Rowland, 40 So. 2d 1 (La. 1948) (finding that a bank
account made up of deposits of rentals from realty belonging to the community of
husband and wife was a community asset, though carried in wife’s name);
McMichael v. McMichael, 205 So. 2d 433 (La. 1967) (finding that husband, who
earned bonuses from his industry with his employer between time that wife
instituted suit for separation in 1958 and entry of judgment of divorce in October
1961, and whose bonuses formed part of his salary not considered in computation
of alimony would be required to account to wife for amounts so received); Barr v.
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an undivided one-half interest in all of the community property
owned by the couple.33 Separate property consists of property
belonging to a spouse prior to the commencement of a community
property regime, as well as things acquired exclusively with separate
assets or with a mixture of separate and community assets where the
amount of the community investment is minimal.34
The law surrounding the community property regime becomes
particularly interesting as it relates to debt.35 As long as the
community property regime continues (for the duration of the
marriage), either spouse may use community funds to pay separate
as well as community debts.36 As such, during the existence of the
regime, there is no actual need to distinguish between separate and
community debts.37 However, upon the termination of the
community property regime, the classification of debts as
community or separate can have significant consequences. One such
consequence is the reimbursement claim.38
Barr, 613 So. 2d 1159 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that evidence supported finding
that watch was community property, despite former husband’s claim that watch
was purchased mostly with separate property by exchanging former husband’s old
jewelry plus smaller amount of cash that was community property); Houghton v.
Hall, 148 So. 37 (La. 1933) (stating that confusion of separate and community
funds in making up consideration for purchasing property makes property
purchased community property).
33. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2014) (noting that Louisiana requires an
equal division of property).
34. Robert Pascal, Louisiana’s 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53
TUL. L. REV 105, 118 (1978). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2014); see
generally Phillips v. Wagner, 470 So. 2d 262 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 52
shares of stock in realty company that were husband’s prior to his marriage were
clearly his separate property); Bass v. Larche, 7 La. Ann. 104 (La. 1852) (stating
that property bought by the husband during the community and paid for out of his
own funds, under circumstances showing a clear intention to buy for his separate
account, is exclusively his); Succession of Hemenway, 83 So. 2d 377 (La. 1955)
(finding that stocks directly traceable to inheritance by decedent from his father’s
estate were assets of decedent’s separate estate and not community property).
35. See Andrea Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the
Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor
Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV 1 (2007) (noting that a great
windfall comes to the creditor whose struggling debtor marries an employed
person in a community property state and creditors’ rights are substantially
expanded by the marriage alone).
36. Pascal, supra note 34, at 120.
37. Id.
38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445, 1312 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
“reimbursement” as “repayment and indemnification”); see also LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2358 (2014) (“A spouse may have a claim against the other spouse for
reimbursement in accordance with the following Articles. A claim for
reimbursement may be asserted only after termination of the community property
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The purpose of a reimbursement claim is to “ultimately [lessen]
the economic burden imposed upon a spouse where he pays debts
for which he should not be held solely responsible.”39 When
community property is used to satisfy a separate obligation of one
spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of
the amount used from his or her patrimony40 to satisfy the debt at
the termination of the regime.41 A claim for reimbursement may be
asserted only after termination of the community property regime.42
Louisiana Civil Code article 2345 demonstrates that a separate
obligation, such as a student loan debt acquired before marriage,
may be satisfied during the marriage using community property.43 In
Louisiana, because all earnings are considered to be community
property, separate debts are almost always going to be paid using
community funds because they are paid from the spouses’ salaries.44
Thus, if one spouse takes out loans prior to the marriage and makes
the subsequent payments with community funds, the non-debtor
spouse can file a reimbursement claim seeking to recover one-half
of that debt at the termination of the community property regime.45
Ultimately, separate debts are not at issue until the termination
of the community property regime.46 However, this issue is
significant because approximately 41%47 of all marriages in the

regime, unless otherwise provided by law.”); see also SPAHT & MORENO, supra
note 13.
39. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 13, at 561.
40. See A. N. YIANNOPULOUS, PROPERTY § 190, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 351 (2001) (defining “patrimony” as “an economic unit consisting of
the sum total of a person’s assets and liabilities”).
41. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2364 (2014). Additionally, the comments
following article 2358.1 expound on the reasoning behind reimbursement claims:
One-half of the community property that was used to satisfy the separate
obligation of a spouse belonged to that spouse and, therefore, no
reimbursement is due to him. The other half of the community property
that was used belonged to the other spouse, and therefore, reimbursement
is due to him.
Id. art. 2364 cmt. c.
42. Id. art. 2358.
43. Id. art. 2345.
44. Earnings are generally considered to be community property. See
generally Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a
wife’s salary was community income).
45. Art. 2364.
46. Pascal, supra note 34, at 118.
47. Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It’s Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/health/19divo.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/JA5L-KTGN] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).

2014]

COMMENT

1015

United States end in divorce.48 As such, in light of a generation
plagued with student loan debt, the laws regarding reimbursement
claims must be revised.49 Under current Louisiana law, individuals
seeking the American dream—higher education, a great job, and a
loving spouse—may ultimately find themselves in a nightmare
divorce under the confines of article 2364.
II. THE ARTICLE 2364 DILEMMA: LOUISIANA’S CURRENT APPROACH
At first glance, Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 seems
innocent enough. It allows for recovery if one spouse uses some of
his or her money to pay the other spouse’s debt.50 However, its
application often leads to harsh results. The text of the article itself
allows no room for consideration of equity or the circumstances of a
particular case.51 It provides an unwavering condition—if there is a
separate debt paid with community funds, then the non-debtor
spouse is entitled to reimbursement.52 A survey of related articles
and jurisprudence affirms that Louisiana’s current law provides no
remedy for the unsuspecting debtor spouse who is left to pay more
money for his or her student loan debt than ever imagined.
A. Article 121: A Misleading Provision
It is a common misconception that Louisiana Civil Code article
121 provides a solution for the inequity in reimbursement claims for
student loan debt.53 Article 121 reads as follows:
48. Of course, all marriages end (if not in divorce) at death. Reimbursement
can also be sought at the death of the debtor spouse, though this is not the focus of
this Comment. See art. 2364.
49. Mark Kantrowitz, Who Graduates College with Six-Figure Student Loan
Debt?, FINAID, www.finaid.org/educators/20120801sixfiguredebt.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012) [http://perma.cc/D8LA-B29V] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (stressing
that the overall number of students graduating with six-figure student loan debt is
low). However, the study notes that that 36.2% of 2007–2008 law school
graduates had six-figure debt. Id. The report also presented a startling rise in the
numbers of borrowers with six-figure loan debt at both the graduate and
undergraduate levels. Id. According to the report, in 1995–1996, the total number
of graduate students with combined undergraduate and graduate debt in six figures
was only 3,300. Id. By 1999–2000, it was 21,200. By 2003–2004, it was 51,100,
and by 2007–2008, it was 70,800. Id. Undergraduates display what may be a
similar trend. Id. In 1999–2000, there were no undergraduates with six-figure debt.
By 2003–2004, there were 2,400, and by 2007–2008, there were 7,800. Id.
50. Art. 2364.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 121.
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In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may
award a party a sum for his financial contributions made
during the marriage to education or training of his spouse
that increased the spouse’s earning power, to the extent that
the claimant did not benefit during the marriage from the
increased earning power. The sum awarded may be in
addition to a sum for support and to property received in the
partition of community property.54
It would seem that an award for one spouse’s contribution to
the other’s education limited “to the extent that the claimant did
not benefit during the marriage from the increased earning power”
would solve the inequity found in article 2364.55 However, an
understanding of the legislative intent underlying article 121 shows
that it is outdated.56 The Legislature enacted this provision to deal
with “the usual situation that has prompted the making of awards
of this kind,” involving a wife who “supported her husband
through professional school, only to be divorced by him shortly
after his graduation.”57 The problem that the Legislature sought to
remedy is no longer a pervasive issue, as men and women stand on
much more equal ground economically.58
Further, article 121 is much too vague to solve the inequity
found in article 2364. The provision does not address the issue of
student loans explicitly, leaving the current state of the law in
essentially the same position of uncertainty provided by article
2364. It does not distinguish separate debts from community debts

Id.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. cmt. c.
57. Id. The comments continue to explain the reasoning behind such awards:
Usually the wife has had little opportunity to share in the husband’s
enhanced income, and ordinarily little or no community property has
accumulated to be divided between them. Thus, the only way to
compensate her is by means of a monetary award akin to support, but
different from support in that it is not affected by the various factors that
govern such an award.

58. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Dionissi Aliprantis et al., The
Growing Difference in College Attainment Between Women and Men, FEDERAL
RES. BANK CLEVELAND, http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011
/2011-21.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [http://perma.cc/B28C-82E9] (archived
Mar. 8, 2014). Aliprantis observes that women have higher educational attainment
rates across all three higher-education categories—associate’s, bachelor’s, and
graduate degrees. Id. Approximately 28% of women ages 24–25 years old have
attained a bachelor’s degree, while only 21% of their male counterparts have done
so. Id. Likewise, approximately 4% of females ages 24–25 have acquired a
professional degree, compared with only 2–3% of their male counterparts. Id.
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or address which spouse is responsible for them. Additionally, the
wording of the article demonstrates that an award under article 121
is discretionary.59 The injustice found in reimbursement claims for
student loan debt requires a more explicit limitation.60
Nevertheless, cases decided under article 121 are useful in
analyzing whether a reimbursement claim for student loan debt
should be permitted. Hunter v. Hunter involved a couple married for
18 years, during which time Mrs. Hunter sought a nursing degree.61
Mr. Hunter paid all of his wife’s educational expenses, except for
tuition, which was paid using student loans.62 Following their
divorce, Mr. Hunter sought reimbursement for the educational
expenses that he paid on behalf of his wife during the time that she
was attending school.63
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal ultimately found
that Mr. Hunter could not recover the money paid toward his wife’s
degree because he benefited from her increased income during the
marriage “by an improved standard of living and an accumulation of
community property.”64 Further, Mrs. Hunter’s student loan debt,
accounting for more than half of the educational expense, was paid
within two years after she began working.65 Essentially, Mr. Hunter
received no reimbursement for his contributions to her education
because the court found that he benefited from her education and
thus indirectly from her debt.66 Injecting the Hunter court’s analysis
into article 2364 would provide for equitable results in situations
where the debt is acquired prior to the marriage but the spouse
similarly benefited from it during the marriage. Unfortunately, the
jurisprudence demonstrates that courts have not made such equitable
considerations in cases dealing with reimbursement claims for
student loan debt, even when the spouse has benefited from the
result of the debt during the marriage.
59. Art. 121.
60. See discussion infra Part III.
61. 813 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1108.
64. Id. at 1109. The court noted that Mrs. Hunter earned approximately
$80,000 during the period between her graduation and the parties’ physical
separation and that all of her earnings were deposited into the parties’ joint
account. Id. Further, in determining Mr. Hunter’s benefit, the court considered
several factors, including “whether the claimant expected a shared benefit when
the contribution was made, the degree of detriment suffered by the claimant in
making the contribution, and the magnitude of the benefit received by the other
spouse.” Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.

1018

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

B. Jurisprudence Involving Reimbursement Claims Generally
Louisiana courts have been willing to consider whether the nondebtor spouse benefited from a debt acquired prior to marriage when
dealing with other types of debt.67 In Parker v. Parker, the court
considered whether a non-debtor spouse had a reimbursement claim
for interest on a mortgage debt.68 The Parkers were married for
approximately four years.69 Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Parker
acquired a townhouse, which was used as the family home.70 The
Parkers made 31 mortgage payments on the debt during the
marriage.71 After the termination of the marriage, the parties agreed
that Mr. Parker was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the
community funds used to reduce the principal portion of this debt.72
However, Mr. Parker asserted that he was further entitled to
reimbursement for half of the community funds used to pay the
interest.73
The court ultimately concluded that the use of Mrs. Parker’s
separate residence by the community was an enjoyment of the
“natural and civil fruits”74 of the separate property.75 Thus, payment
of the interest benefited the community because it was a cost of
maintaining the natural and civil fruits of this separate property for
the community’s use.76 Therefore, the court concluded that the
interest cost should not be included in the amount to which the other
67. Sims v. Sims, 677 So. 2d 663, 667 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that
husband was not entitled to reimbursement for half of the community funds paid
to interest on mortgage where the wife’s separate property had benefited the
community by serving as the family home). See also Hurta v. Hurta 260 So. 2d
324, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that “[b]y providing his separate house as
the family home, the husband dedicates its actual ‘profits’ . . . to the community,
and that dedication produces an actual, in-pocket, dollar saving to the community
in the form of the rent for another house which the community consequently does
not have to expend”); see generally Willis v. Willis, 454 So. 2d 429, 431 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that the interest cost on a husband’s separate mortgage should
not have been included in the amount to which his wife was entitled to
reimbursement).
68. 517 So. 2d 264, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
69. Id. at 264.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 551 (2014) (“Fruits are things that are produced by or
derived from another thing without diminution of its substance. . . . [N]atural fruits
are products of the earth or of animals. Civil fruits are revenues derived from a
thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals, interest,
and certain corporate distributions.”).
75. Parker, 517 So. 2d at 265.
76. Id.
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spouse is entitled for reimbursement.77 Oddly enough, though the
benefit enjoyed by a non-debtor spouse as a result of the debtor
spouse’s student loan debt is analogous to the benefit found in cases
involving mortgages, Louisiana courts have been unwilling to
extend this reasoning to claims for student loan debt.
C. Jurisprudence Involving Reimbursement Claims for Student Loan
Debt
Although there is a substantial amount of jurisprudence
regarding reimbursement claims for student loan debt in Louisiana,
there are very few cases dealing specifically with student loan debt
acquired prior to marriage. This distinction is important because
student loan debt acquired during marriage, which is considered a
community obligation, is ineligible for a reimbursement claim.78 An
analysis of those cases, coupled with an understanding of the courts’
reasonings in cases dealing with student loan debts acquired during
the marriage, demonstrates Louisiana’s desperate need to amend the
current law to reflect societal expectations.
In Katner v. Katner, a couple brought various reimbursement
claims against each other after the termination of their ten-year
marriage.79 One of these claims involved Mr. Katner’s assertion that
he was entitled to reimbursement for half of the amount paid toward
Mrs. Katner’s separate debt.80 Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Katner had
taken out student loans to fund her legal education,81 and during the
marriage, the couple used community funds to satisfy the debt.82
In resolving the case, the appellate court applied a strict and
literal interpretation of article 2364.83 It found that the trial court
correctly determined that community funds were used to satisfy
Mrs. Katner’s separate debt, and Mr. Katner was entitled to
reimbursement valued at half the amount of the community funds
used to pay the debt.84

77. Id.
78. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (2014) (“An obligation incurred by a spouse
during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest of
the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation.”).
79. 28 So. 3d 566, 569 (La. Ct. App. 2009). See also art. 551. Because the
spouses did not exclude the community property regime under article 2339, the
regime was established pursuant to article 2334.
80. Katner, 28 So. 3d at 575.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 576.
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This holding perfectly exemplifies Louisiana’s current approach
to student loan debt acquired prior to marriage. The court applied
the literal text of article 2364 without considering the circumstances
of the particular case.85 The court failed to consider the length of the
marriage, the financial contributions that Mrs. Katner made to the
marriage, or the benefits that her profession provided.86 All of these
factors were directly related to the student loan debt she acquired to
pursue her legal degree, and declining to consider those factors led
to an inequitable result. Mr. Katner enjoyed the fruits of Mrs.
Katner’s legal education for almost a decade, yet he was still able to
recover a significant amount of money.87 The benefits that Mr.
Katner received from Mrs. Katner’s higher earning capacity were
still not enough to preclude him from recovery.88 Most people do
not expect such a result after allowing their spouse to benefit from
their higher earning capacity for the duration of the marriage.89
Aside from Katner, the other relevant cases involve debts
acquired during the marriage.90 This is particularly significant
because current statistics regarding the average amount of student
loan debt and the age of first marriage suggest that today’s betrothed
couples expect their future spouses to enter the marriage with
student loan debts.91 Current law simply does not reflect that reality.
Nevertheless, in McConathy v. McConathy, the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal shed some light on considerations
that may be helpful in determining whether a reimbursement claim
for student loan debt is appropriate.92 The case involved a couple
seeking to partition their community property as part of their divorce
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 569, 575.
Id.
See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 4.12 cmt. a (2002). The American Law
Institute asserts that “[a]fter many years of marriage, spouses typically do not
think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so
classified under the technical property rules.” Id.; When You Say ‘I Do,’ Who Pays
the Debt?, BUDGETS ARE SEXY (July 15, 2012), http://www.budgetsaresexy
.com/2012/07/married-debt-who-pays [http://perma.cc/FY8-J6MS] (archived Mar.
8, 2014) (noting that in asking a handful of married and non-married persons about
debt obtained prior to marriage, “[a]ll of the people [she] asked stated they believe
once married, all debts prior to marriage should be paid by the couple and is no
longer just the responsibility of the individual debtor. It was no longer ‘his debt’ or
‘her debt’ but ‘our debt.’”).
90. See McConathy v. McConathy, 632 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (La. Ct. App.
1994); see also Munson v. Munson, 772 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
91. See discussion supra Part I.A.
92. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1200.
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proceedings.93 Mr. and Mrs. McConathy94 married in 1976, and
shortly thereafter, Mrs. McConathy suggested that Mr. McConathy
return to school to pursue a degree in elementary education.95 While
Mr. McConathy attended school, Mrs. McConathy worked full time
and was the primary source of support for the family.96 The couple
ultimately separated in May of 1988, and Mr. McConathy received
his degree later that year.97
After receiving a judgment of divorce, Mrs. McConathy sought
to partition the community property and subsequently requested
reimbursement for her contributions to her husband’s education,
including both living expenses and payments toward his student
loan debt.98 The trial court granted Mrs. McConathy an award for
her contribution to her husband’s education under article 121 but
found that his student loans comprised a community debt and
therefore denied her request for reimbursement.99
On appeal, Mrs. McConathy argued that the trial court erred in
classifying her husband’s student loan debt as a community debt.100
In resolving the issue of the student debt, the appellate court
determined that the debt was a community obligation.101 The court
concluded that, at the time that the student loans were obtained, Mr.
and Mrs. McConathy contemplated that Mr. McConathy’s “pursuit
of a higher education would ultimately benefit the community by
increasing his earning capacity. . . [and t]herefore . . . the funds were
obtained for the ‘common interests of the spouses.’”102
Likewise, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in
Munson v. Munson echoed the ruling of McConathy, finding that
student loans obtained by Mrs. Munson during her ten-year marriage
were acquired in hopes that they would benefit the Munson
93. Id. at 1202.
94. The case, though named McConathy v. McConathy, consistently refers to
the wife as Ms. Prestridge suggesting that, after the divorce, she chose to revert
back to using her maiden name. For clarity purposes, the author will refer to her as
Mrs. McConathy.
95. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202.
96. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2014).
97. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202.
98. Id. Mrs. McConathy requested reimbursement under article 121, which is
discussed infra Part III.B. Though she did not seek to recover under article 2364
(as it did not go into effect until 1980), the court’s reasoning is still relevant to the
current analysis.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (2014) (defining a community obligation
as “[a]n obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community
property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the
other spouse is a community obligation”).
102. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1207.
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family.103 The facts in Munson are essentially the same as in
McConathy: Mrs. Munson acquired two student loans during her
marriage, and community funds were used to satisfy the
obligation.104 The Munson court cited McConathy, finding that the
Munsons “anticipated that the 1991 and 1992 student loans would
ultimately improve Mrs. Munson’s earning power for the
community’s benefit.”105
Although McConathy and Munson involve student loan debt
obtained during the marriage, the same reasoning from these cases
logically applies to debt obtained prior to the marriage.106 In fact,
both courts’ rulings precisely advocate that the same reasoning
apply to debt obtained prior to the marriage.107 The McConathy
court noted that to determine whether the funds used to pay the
student loan debt were beneficial to the community, an examination
must be made as to the uses to which it was put.108 The court
decided that because Mr. McConathy obtained the loans in hopes of
ultimately being a better provider for his family, the loans were
acquired for the common interests of the spouses.109 The
classification of the debt as a community obligation is particularly
interesting in light of the fact that Mr. McConathy did not even
obtain his degree until after the separation.110 Mrs. McConathy did
not even have the chance to benefit from the debt, yet the court
found that it was a community obligation merely because it was
intended to benefit the family.111 The Munson court iterated similar
concerns.112 As such, it seems that both courts stretched the
definition of a community obligation, classifying the student loan
debt in a manner likely to preserve an equitable result while staying
within the limited action allowed by the Civil Code.113 These results
suggest that, though the courts in Munson and McConathy could
103. Munson v. Munson, 772 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202; see also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145.
107. See McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202; see also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145.
108. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1206.
109. Id. at 1207.
110. Id. at 1202.
111. Id.
112. Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145. The Munson court cited McConathy and
agreed that, in order to determine whether the debt benefited the community, the
court must examine the uses to which it was put. Id. Ultimately, the Munson court
characterized the student loans as community property and found that the
Munsons “anticipated that the . . . student loans would ultimately improve Mrs.
Munson’s earning power for the community’s benefit.” Id.
113. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1207. See also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145; LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2364 (2014).
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have classified the student loan debt as separate, they did not do so
to avoid allowing the claimant–spouses to obtain reimbursement.
The facts in Katner, dealing with a student loan debt acquired
before marriage, parallel those of McConathy and Munson, with the
exception of the time when the loan was obtained.114 As the law
currently stands, the timing of the debt changes everything. Because
regardless of the temporal element, couples anticipate benefiting
from the opportunities allowed by the student loan debt, there is no
logical reason to make different considerations when dealing with
student loan debt acquired prior to the marriage and student loan
debt acquired during the marriage. The Legislature’s fascination
with the temporal connection between the student loan debt and the
marriage does not reflect the societal expectations exhibited by
current developments in marriage and education.115 As such, a sharp
distinction must be drawn between student loan debt and other kinds
of debt.
III. STUDENT LOAN DEBT AS THE EXCEPTION: A PUBLIC POLICY
ANALYSIS
Above all else, the law should reflect what reasonable people
would realistically expect it to be.116 Society evolves, and
consequently, some laws must be periodically reconsidered to
accommodate societal change. Today’s married couples would not
realistically expect to be blindsided by a reimbursement claim for
money contributed toward a student loan debt that both agreed
would be beneficial to their life together.117 This peculiarity suggests
that student loan debt is not like other types of debt and needs
directed regulation. Additionally, as a matter of public policy,
people would not envision that the law allows an unjust double, or
even triple, recovery, particularly in light of an event as traumatic as
114. Katner v. Katner, 28 So. 3d 566, 575 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
115. See discussion supra Part I.
116. Elizabeth Cook, Laws Should Reflect ‘Reality of Modern Society’,
POLITICSHOME (Nov. 9, 2009), http://centrallobby.politicshome.com/latestnews
/article-detail/newsarticle/laws-should-reflect-reality-of-modern-society/ [http://per
ma.cc/5RN2-7UDK] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (noting that it is “vital that the legal
rules remain relevant and up-to-date, reflecting the reality of modern society and the
reasonable expectations of those who have been bereaved”); Law Reforms Should
Reflect Changes in Society, HINDU (Feb. 5, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com
/news/cities/Hyderabad/law-reforms-should-reflect-changes-in-society/article11
56903.ece [http://perma.cc/Z4GL-MHQU] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that
“reforms in law should be in tune with the changing socio-economic conditions of
society”).
117. AM. LAW INST., supra note 89; When You Say ‘I Do,’ Who Pays the
Debt?, supra note 89.
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divorce.118 Louisiana’s current law does not comprehend these
realities and must be revised to limit reimbursement claims for
student loan debt.
A. Student Loan Debt Does Not Fit Into the Mold of Other Debt
This Comment does not suggest that Louisiana law should
exempt all debt from the possibility of a reimbursement claim. In
fact, with most kinds of debt, providing the opportunity to file a
reimbursement claim is completely equitable. For example, consider
a situation in which one spouse purchases a home prior to the
commencement of marriage and portions of the other spouse’s
wages are used to pay off the mortgage on that house. After divorce,
the non-debtor spouse no longer receives any benefit from
contributing to the purchase of that home. In this scenario, a
reimbursement claim is an equitable remedy. However, the
characteristics that make a reimbursement claim equitable under
these and similar circumstances are not reflected in student loan
debt.
Student loan debt is different from other types of debt because
most states, including Louisiana, do not recognize educational
degrees as property, asserting that a degree does not have “the
characteristics of ‘property’ as defined in a legal context.”119
Rather, courts consider a degree to be merely “a formal recognition
of an individual’s competency and skill.”120 Moreover, most courts
do not view educational degrees as property because of the inherent
difficulty found in calculating the value of a degree.121 This
classification has particular significance in a community property
state because if treated as property, a degree would likely be
considered to be community property and would thus be subject to a
division of its value at the termination of the community property
regime. 122
Valuing a degree would require contemplation of factors such as
which university the individual attended, how well he or she
performed in school, what the current job market is in his or her
particular field and locale, and how he or she used the degree. As
such, Louisiana has remained steadfast in its refusal to recognize a
degree as property, and its reasoning for this choice provides a
118. See discussion infra Part III.B.
119. Gessner v. Gessner, 614 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id.
121. Id. (noting that the definition of property in Louisiana “cannot be so
extended and distorted to include within that definition a professional degree and
license”). See also Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
122. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2014).
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sound basis for simultaneously distinguishing student loan debt from
other types of debt as they pertain to reimbursement claims.123
Louisiana courts do not consider degrees as property because doing
so would lead to confusing, inconsistent, and likely unfair results.124
In the same vein, allowing reimbursement for one-half of the funds
paid to satisfy student loan debt in the wake of the divorce may lead
to perplexing and inequitable outcomes.
B. The Law Should Not Encourage Inequitable Recovery
Though student loan debt does not fit into the mold of other
debts susceptible to reimbursement claims under article 2364, there
is another, more important reason that student loan debt should be
exempt from reimbursement claims: The law should not encourage
inequitable recovery.125
Traditionally, the civil law views equity strictly as a means to fill
gaps in the Code when the law is silent on an issue.126 Louisiana
Civil Code article 21 originally read as follows:
In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To
decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and
reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent.127

123. Gessner, 614 So. 2d at 309.
124. For example, in some instances one might attend a prestigious school, yet
never use his or her degree for what it was intended. In other cases, one might
graduate from an unranked two-year college, yet might use the degree he or she
obtained to its highest capacity. It would be difficult to reconcile these cases to
achieve equitable results.
125. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2055 (2014) (defining “equity” as the principle
that “no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another”); see also Kennard v.
Kennard, 747 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the trial court’s
decision to allow a reimbursement claim because “[o]nce [the trial court] stated
that issue of reimbursement for educational contribution to wife had been
stipulated to be $13,000 and ‘taken care of’ in community property partition, the
court could not award [husband] an additional $13,000 as reimbursement for
educational contributions . . . . To do so would thwart efforts between the parties
to settle their community disputes, and . . . it would give [husband] the benefit of
an unlawful double recovery.”).
126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2014).
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1870) (emphasis added). See generally Mitchell
Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L. REV. 485 (1935).
Though the substance of article 21 now resides in article 4 and no longer maintains
the precise wording of the previous article, the revision comments make it clear
that the revision did not change the law.
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Thus, the Civil Code is meant to be equitable on its face,
allowing the judge discretion only when the Code explicitly grants it
or when the law is silent on an issue.128 Because the Code
essentially allows judicial discretion as a final resort, it is important
to ensure that the default law reflects such equity. Unfortunately, the
law governing reimbursement claims is not equitable on its face, and
thus it would be prudent for Louisiana to follow in the footsteps of
other community property states in drafting specific legislation to
expressly include equity in the method that courts use to award
reimbursement claims for student loan debt.129
Reimbursement claims for student loan debt are inequitable in
their own right because they allow the non-debtor spouse to enjoy
both the benefit of the opportunities allowed by the debt and
recovery of half the amount contributed to it. However, this inequity
is severely compounded when considered alongside the additional
claims that the non-debtor spouse may have that are likewise
associated with the debtor spouse’s attempt to obtain higher
education.
The first additional claim that the non-debtor spouse may have
against the debtor spouse is for spousal support.130 There are two
kinds of spousal support in Louisiana: interim periodic support and
final periodic support.131 Though neither is guaranteed, Louisiana
Civil Code article 116 suggests that interim spousal support cannot
be waived. Both types of spousal support involve a consideration of
the spouse’s ability to pay, which is directly correlative to the higher
earning capacity received in large part because of the education paid
128. Art. 4.
129. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
130. LA. CIV. CODE art. 111 (2014).
131. See id. In Louisiana, spousal support is granted “in proportion to the
wants of the person requiring it, and the circumstances of those who are to pay it.”
Id. art. 231. Additionally, though neither is guaranteed, interim spousal support
cannot be waived. See id. art. 116 (“The obligation of final spousal support may
be modified, waived, or extinguished by judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction or by authentic act or act under private signature duly acknowledged
by the obligee.”). There is no similar article allowing for a waiver of interim
spousal support. The generally accepted notion is that, unlike interim support, final
support is not a matter of public order about which couples are forbidden to
contract under article 7. See generally McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85 (La.
1996); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 113 (2014) (noting that interim support
terminates upon the rendition of a judgment awarding or denying final spousal
support, though it can continue for an additional period of 180 days after a
judgment of divorce and even longer with good cause). In determining whether
interim spousal support is appropriate, the court considers the needs of the
claimant, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the standard of living that the
couple enjoyed for the duration of their marriage. Id.
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for by the student loan.132 Further, some courts have been quite
liberal with their awards of spousal support in the past, taking into
account the spouse’s potential earning capacity when considering
the limit on the award.133 This fact is particularly relevant to the
issue of student loan debt because pursuing higher education
increases an individual’s earning power, though conceivably he or
she may not decide to pursue that power to its full capacity.134
Perhaps a spouse attends law school but decides that his or her
talents are better suited for public interest work than for being a
litigator in a high-powered firm. His or her salary is a far cry from
the potential earning capacity resulting from working for a large
firm.135 The court could consider that unfulfilled earning potential in
awarding spousal support.136 The inequity in these circumstances
lies in the fact that current law essentially allows non-debtor spouses
the opportunity to have their cake and eat it too. The non-debtor
spouse is repaid for his or her contribution to a separate obligation
that aided in funding the lifestyle to which the couple became
accustomed during the marriage, but he or she is also awarded
spousal support based on the debtor spouse’s income, which is

132. Art. 113 (noting that “the court may award a party an interim spousal
support allowance based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to
pay, and the standard of living of the parties during the marriage”).
133. See Moore v. Moore, 866 So. 2d 910, 917 (La. Ct. App. 2004). The
Moore court’s reasoning was as follows:
Christopher has a significant earning capacity. In addition to his
experience as a financial planner, he now has worldwide certification as a
soccer coach. Christopher makes the assertion that the $700.00 per month
award exceeds one-third of his net income. We find the record unclear as
to Christopher’s exact net income. There was enough testimony to
establish that Christopher receives $1,700.00 per monthly salary plus an
additional $300.00 per week for playing soccer and that he has
substantially larger earning capacity. We, therefore, affirm the $700.00
award of spousal support.
Id.; see also Roan v. Roan, 870 So. 2d 626, 635 (La. Ct. App. 2004). In Roan v.
Roan, Mr. Roan, a 70-year-old man, sought to lower the alimony payments to his
ex-wife after he retired, arguing that his income was substantially less. Id. The
court agreed with the trial court’s finding that “although Mr. Roan was 70 years
old at the time of judgment, he was a vigorous man capable of continuing to
work” and affirmed the original spousal support amount. Id.
134. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 25.
135. See Lisa Faye Petak, Young Lawyers Turn to Public Service, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20
/us/20defer.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/84P3-HCGU] (archived Mar. 8, 2014)
(noting that the pay gap between public interest and private firm work is “steep”:
Public interest attorneys generally start at, on average, $35,000 to $39,000 a year
versus $140,000 to $150,000 with a large firm).
136. Moore, 866 So. 2d at 917.
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statistically higher than it would have been without the student
loans.137
Unfortunately, the debtor spouse’s troubles may not end with the
combination of spousal support and reimbursement claims. Suppose
that one spouse takes out a student loan sufficient to cover the cost
of tuition and textbooks but additionally relies on the non-debtor
spouse to provide basic living expenses while the debtor spouse is
attending school. Depending on the circumstances, the non-debtor
spouse may also have a second, additional claim against the debtor
spouse under article 121, although awards under this provision are
limited to the extent that the spouse did not benefit during the
marriage from the increased earning power.138 Thus, if the couple
has not been married long enough for the non-debtor spouse to
enjoy the fruits of the debtor spouse’s labor, the non-debtor spouse
can also recover any contribution that he or she made to the debtor
spouse’s education.139 The non-debtor spouse in such a situation
could theoretically demand reimbursement for payments toward the
student loan debts, reimbursement for his or her financial
contribution to the couple’s living expenses, and spousal support.140
Ultimately, a reimbursement claim for funds contributed to
student loan debt obtained prior to the marriage allows inequitable
recovery on its own. However, that injustice is magnified when
considered alongside the additional claims that a spouse could
potentially file.141 Under the current law, Louisiana is promoting a
system that allows bitter spouses to recover not once, but possibly
three times in a situation where the spouse has already benefited
greatly from the opportunities made possible by the debt.

137. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, workers 18 and over possessing
bachelor’s degrees earn an average of $54,756 per year, while those with a high
school diploma earn a mere $33,176. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra
note 25. Workers with a professional degree top the chart making an average of
$86,580 per year. Id.
138. See discussion supra Part II.A.
139. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2014).
140. Id. cmt. d (“‘Financial contributions’ include direct educational or training
expenses paid by the claimant for the other spouse—such as tuition, books, and
school fees. The term also includes financial contributions made to satisfy the
living expenses of the supported spouse.”). See generally DeLa Rosa v. DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Reiss v. Reiss, 478 A.2d 441 (N.J. Ch.
1984).
141. As previously mentioned, the spouse could have a claim for spousal
support under article 111 or a claim for contribution under article 121.
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C. The Law Should Reflect Reasonable Societal Expectations
The most compelling reason for limiting reimbursement claims
for student loan debt is a simple matter of public policy. In taking
out loans and getting married, most people are likely not aware that
they could be responsible for a significantly larger amount of money
than they borrowed.142 As previously mentioned, couples today
stand on quite different ground than they did 40 years ago.143 Those
differences are mirrored in the process of courtship. Today, twothirds of couples live together before marriage.144 Living with an
individual gives exposure to his or her financial responsibilities, and
even if a couple doesn’t cohabitate, couples likely discuss finances
before committing to marriage.145 Thus, it is not likely that student
loan debt comes as a surprise to prospective newlyweds.
However, it is likely that many people would be shocked to
learn that their spouse could reclaim half of the community money
paid toward their student loan debt, particularly when this debt
ultimately contributed to the couple’s standard of living and quality
of life.146 Most people would probably assume that contributing
community funds to student loan debt is more like contributing
community funds to pay a utility bill—both spouses share the
benefit of what is obtained, and thus they must share the debt. In the
case of student loans, both spouses share the benefit that the higher
education provides. If both spouses agree to share these benefits,
they likely also agree to share the expenses that are necessary to
enjoy them. Such an expectation is entirely reasonable, yet
Louisiana’s current law does not embody that notion. Instead, it

142. This is particularly true for individuals who do not have access to a legal
education or the advice of an attorney.
143. See discussion supra Part I.A.
144. Leslie Mann, Cohabiting Happily Ever After, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 9, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-09/news/ct-x-living-together-201205
09_1_cohabiting-premarital-education-couples [http://perma.cc/GVS2-CBWT]
(archived Mar. 8, 2014). See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE UC-1. UNMARRIED
COUPLES OF THE OPPOSITE SEX, BY PRESENCE OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT
(2014), available at https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/uc1.xls [http://perma
.cc/SGG7-8T6L] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). In 1960, approximately 439,000
American couples cohabitated before marriage. Id. In 2000, that number increased to
4.9 million. Id. Today, approximately 8 million people choose to cohabitate before
marriage. Id.
145. Ludden, supra note 29.
146. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 89, § 4.12 cmt. a. The American Law
Institute asserts that “[a]fter many years of marriage, spouses typically do not
think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so
classified under the technical property rules.” Id.
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provides a means for angry spouses to demand recovery, allowing
them to have their cake and eat it too.
IV. NON-DEBTOR SPOUSES CANNOT HAVE THEIR CAKE AND EAT IT
TOO
The current law surrounding reimbursement claims for student
loan debt is ripe for revision. Of course, a couple can compose a
prenuptial agreement waiving the right to reimbursement; however,
spouses who do not have the benefit of a legal education or the
advice of counsel would likely not be aware of the consequences of
not having a prenuptial agreement.147 Further, even if a couple is
aware and understands the consequences, they still might decline to
draft a prenuptial agreement because of the emotional and trust
issues that are attached to such agreements.148 In fact, very few
married or engaged individuals have a prenuptial agreement,
demonstrating that this is probably not a realistic solution to the
student loan debt problem in Louisiana.149
There are two possible ways to solve the inequity that results
from allowing reimbursement claims for student loan debt. The first
solution is a judicial one—one in which the court applies the
reasoning used by the court in Parker, which dealt with payments
made during the marriage on a home acquired prior to the
marriage.150 The second and best solution is to draft additional
legislation to preempt the problem altogether by substantially
limiting the extent to which the non-debtor spouse is awarded
reimbursement for student loan debt payments. This approach may
be achieved by looking to laws implemented in other community
property states for guidance.

147. Though there is a presumption that things acquired during the marriage
are community, couples can contract out of the community property regime. See
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340 (2014).
148. Carlin Flora, Let’s Make a Deal, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Nov. 1, 2004),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200411/lets-make-deal [http://perma.cc
/9UW9-TL7C] (archived Mar. 8, 2014).
149. See Laura Petrecca, Prenuptial Agreements: Unromantic, but Important,
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/2010-03-08-prenups
08_CV_N.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 2010) [http://perma.cc/GNC8-2VQ8]
(archived Mar. 8, 2014).
150. Parker v. Parker, 517 So. 2d 264, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1987). See also
discussion supra accompanying note 68.
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A. Judicial Solution: Applying the Reasoning of Parker v. Parker
In Parker, the court focused on the notion that, although the
interest on the mortgage loan resulted from a separate obligation, the
non-debtor spouse was not entitled to reimbursement of the interest
because he benefited from the use of the property.151 Louisiana’s
courts should apply similar logic in analyzing reimbursement claims
for student loan debts, primarily because the same focus can be
applied by analogy to such claims.
The court in Parker noted that the community’s use of the
separate property was “an enjoyment of the ‘natural and civil fruits’
of the separate property” and that the “cost of the benefit to the
community included the payment of interest.”152 Although it is true
that a degree is not considered property in Louisiana,153 the courts’
focus in mortgage cases is not on the property but on the enjoyment
and use of the thing.154 In fact, by allowing the community to use
the separate property, the debtor spouse kept the community from
having the expense of rent for another house.155 The result is that the
community ultimately had more capital than it otherwise would
have had.156 Similarly, the debtor spouse’s student loan provides
him or her with the opportunity to earn more money and thus that
separate debt eventually leads to the community obtaining more
money than it would have had.157 In both cases, the community (and
therefore the non-debtor spouse) gets the benefits of the revenue
gained as a result of the debtor spouse’s increased earning capacity
resulting from the education he or she acquired with debts.
Thus, one solution to the inequity in allowing reimbursement
claims for student loan debt is for courts to apply by analogy the
“consideration of benefit” logic to circumstances in which student
loan debt is acquired prior to marriage. Doing so would establish a
jurisprudential rule that student loan debt benefits the community as
the business cost of maintaining and using the civil fruits of the
separate property, and as such the non-debtor spouse is not entitled
to reimbursement. Though such a solution would certainly lessen the
inequity in allowing reimbursement claims for student loan debt, it
still leaves room for inconsistent results if left strictly to the
discretion of the judiciary.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See discussion supra Part III.A.
Parker, 517 So. 2d at 265.
Gessner v. Gessner, 614 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
See discussion supra accompanying note 68.
See Hurta v. Hurta, 260 So. 2d 324, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
Id.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 25.
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B. A Legislative Proposal
Drafting new legislation that expressly deals with the issue of
student loan debt would likely be the most effective resolution to the
reimbursement claim dilemma. New legislation would provide more
consistent results and accurately reflect both equity and societal
expectations regarding marriage and student loan debt.158 Several
other community property states provide legislation that either deals
specifically with the issue of student loan debt or at least codifies
equitable considerations.159 The most insightful legislation comes
from Texas and California after which the Louisiana Legislature
should model an amendment to article 2364.160
1. Using Texas as a Model for Revision
Texas’s pertinent law focuses entirely on equity, a principle that
seems lost on Louisiana’s Legislature with regard to reimbursement
claims. Under section 7.007 of the Texas Family Code, the court
“shall apply equitable principles” to “determine whether to recognize
the claim [for reimbursement] after taking into account all the relative
circumstances of the spouses” and to “order a division of the claim
for reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner that the court

158. See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
159. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.007 (West 2006); see also CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2641 (West 2004).
160. Some community property states use a system of equitable distribution,
and others employ a system of equal division. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA
A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 476 (2004). In an
equitable distribution system, both spouses are entitled to their fair share of the
profits of the marriage, allowing for the possibility of unequal division. BRETT R.
TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1:1 (3d ed. 2011). Further,
equitable distribution applies only in cases of divorce. Equal division focuses on
an equivalent division of the assets. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra, at 476.
Additionally, equal division controls property ownership for the duration of the
marriage, as well as property distribution at death and divorce. Id. The most
important distinction between the systems lies in their uses of judicial discretion.
Id. Equitable distribution implies a large amount of discretion—the court divides
the couple’s assets according to general community property laws but can make
additional equitable considerations. Id. In an equal division state like Louisiana,
there is little room for equitable considerations by the judge if they are not written
into the law itself. Id. Though Texas law fits under the system of equitable
distribution, the considerations that it employs in determining whether to award
reimbursement are nevertheless helpful to achieve equitable and just results and
are therefore relevant considerations in revising Louisiana law.
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considers just and right, having due regard for the rights of each
party and any children of the marriage.”161
Under this provision, the Texas Legislature suggests that
different debts should be treated differently, depending upon the
circumstances in which they are acquired. The Louisiana Legislature
should take note of Texas’s careful consideration of equitable
principles in light of the circumstances of a particular case. Doing so
would allow for reimbursement claims where appropriate but forbid
applying the blanket provision of the current version of article 2364
in cases where the non-debtor spouse benefited from the
opportunities resulting from the debt to the extent that allowing
reimbursement would be unjust. Though the community property
system employed by Texas, giving judges a great deal of discretion,
differs somewhat from the system used in Louisiana, it is
nonetheless a useful model for dealing with the issue of student loan
debt.162
2. Using California as a Model for Revision
While Texas’s law provides some guidance as to the
reimbursement claim issue, California’s Family Code provides the
best solution to the inequity caused by allowing reimbursement for
student loan debt in a context that fits squarely within the
community property system applied in Louisiana. Like Louisiana,
California employs a system of equal division, meaning that at the
end of the community property regime, each spouse is a co-owner of
one-half of the community assets.163 Section 2641 of the California
Family Code deals directly with community contributions to
education.164 The provision, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
The community shall be reimbursed for community
contributions to education or training of a party that
substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party . . . .
The reimbursement and assignment required by this section
shall be reduced or modified to the extent circumstances
render such a disposition unjust, including, but not limited
to, any of the following:
The community has substantially benefited from the
education, training, or loan incurred for the education or
161. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 7.007, 3.402 (describing reimbursement claims
generally) (2006).
162. See discussion supra note 160.
163. See discussion supra note 160.
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641.
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training of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption,
affecting the burden of proof, that the community has not
substantially benefited from community contributions to the
education or training made less than 10 years before the
commencement of the proceeding, and that the community
has substantially benefited from community contributions to
the education or training made more than 10 years before the
commencement of the proceeding.
The education or training received by the party is offset by
the education or training received by the other party for
which community contributions have been made . . . .165
Essentially, under California law, a non-debtor spouse is
allowed to file a reimbursement claim against the debtor spouse for
funds contributed to a separate student loan debt; however, the
ability to receive the award is limited to the extent that both
spouses have benefited from the opportunities allowed by the
debt.166 This provision demonstrates that California’s Legislature
emphasizes the duration of the marriage, providing a rebuttable
presumption that the spouses did not benefit from the community
contribution to the debt if it was made less than ten years before
the termination of the community property regime.167
The text of the provision prohibits reimbursement when
reimbursement would render an unjust disposition.168 Though the
basic rule is that community contributions must be reimbursed, that
right is limited to contributions made during the preceding ten years
“to minimize . . . potential inequity.”169 The California Legislature’s
revision comments make it clear that its focus is not on whether the
debt was obtained as a separate or community debt, but rather
whether the community ultimately benefited from the debt:
[I]f one party receives a[n] . . . education, degree, and license
at community expense, but the marriage endures for some
time with a high standard of living and substantial
accumulation of community assets attributable to the . . .
training, it may be inappropriate to require reimbursement.170

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. law revision commission cmts.
Id.
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This situation is exactly the kind that Louisiana law has failed to
account for and perfectly exemplifies the need to revise the current
law.
3. A Practical Solution
Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 should be revised to instill
equity and societal expectations into the law dealing with
reimbursement claims for student loan debt. The revision of article
2364 must take into account the increased earning capacity of the
debtor spouse that occurs almost solely as a result of the student loan
debt, as well as the higher standard of living and the accumulation of
community assets attributable to that higher earning potential.171 To do
so, the Louisiana Legislature should consider drafting a revision of
Article 2364 that reads as follows:
Art. 2364. Satisfaction of separate obligation with community
property or former community property
If community property has been used during the existence of
the community property regime or former community property
has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate obligation of a
spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for onehalf of the amount or value that the property had at the time it
was used.
Nevertheless, the reimbursement required by this article shall
be reduced, modified, or extinguished to the extent such
circumstances render a disposition unjust, such as situations in
which the community has substantially benefited from the
education, training, or debt incurred for the education or
training of the party.172
By forcing courts to consider whether the community benefited
from the debtor spouse’s acquisition of the debt, the Legislature would
solve the inequities that exist in the present version of article 2364 and
better conform to today’s social realities of student loan debt and
marriage.173 Defining a “substantial benefit” would be left to the courts
and would ideally focus on the duration of the marriage, the impact the
171. In fact, under the California provision, the revision comments note that
the consideration of a higher earning capacity does not require “that the party
actually work in an occupation to which the enhancement applies.” See id.
172. The italicized portion designates the changes to article 2364 proposed by
the author.
173. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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acquisition of the debt ultimately had on the debtor spouse’s earning
capacity, and the couple’s standard of living during the marriage.
This Comment’s proposed version of article 2364 exemplifies
precisely what the article was undoubtedly aiming to accomplish but
failed to achieve: an article based in equity.174 The proposed revision
would not eliminate reimbursement claims for student loan debt
entirely. Rather, the revision would allow such claims when the
marriage was of such short duration that the non-debtor spouse had no
chance to enjoy the benefit of the debtor spouse’s increased earning
capacity. However, the revision would also protect debtor spouses from
essentially paying their loan debt one-and-a-half times in situations
where their spouses enjoyed the fruits of the debt. Additionally, the
Legislature could choose to adopt other characteristics of California’s
statute should it prefer more concrete parameters for reimbursement
claims.175 Such a provision provides balanced, equitable results while
accurately portraying what society would expect when entering into a
marriage in which one or both spouses have student loan debt.
CONCLUSION
Under current Louisiana Civil Code article 2364, a prospective
spouse with student loan debt should exercise a bit more caution when
considering that walk down the aisle. Under the current law, bitter exspouses can demand repayment of half the value of the payments made
toward their spouse’s student loan debt, despite the fact that they may
have enjoyed numerous advantages as a result of the loan. Moreover,
an angry spouse could potentially be allowed double, or even triple,
recovery in the wake of a nasty divorce.
Though a plethora of problems may arise as a result of
reimbursement claims, the most daunting issue is the high level of
inequity that generally occurs as a result. As such, Louisiana must
remedy this injustice, either jurisprudentially or, preferably,
legislatively. Doing so would be consistent with Louisiana’s aim to
achieve equity and would remove a non-debtor spouse’s ability to
174. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2055 (2014) (defining “equity” as the principle
that “no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another”).
175. For example, Louisiana’s Legislature might choose to adopt presumptions
similar to those implemented by California. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (West
2004). The presumption maintains the equity standard because it allows the nondebtor spouse to at least have that presumption in his favor. However, it still
remains equitable to the debtor spouse because, practically speaking, the
presumption will likely not be difficult to overcome when the non-debtor spouse
has enjoyed a higher standard of living and countless benefits as a result of the
debtor spouse’s higher income.
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recover funds contributed to student loan debts acquired prior to the
marriage to the extent that he or she benefited from those loans through
an increased standard of living. The end result is two-fold: law that
reflects both the preservation of equity and the normal expectations of
society.
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